

**[Online Appendix] Conforming Against  
Expectations:  
The Formalism of Non-Lawyers at the  
World Trade Organization**

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## Online Appendix

### OA1 Combining Multiple Imputation and Propensity Score Matching

Our analytical approach combines both multiple imputation and propensity-score matching. The intent to apply both methods of multiple imputation and of propensity-score matching to the data raises a question about how these two methods should be combined. In general, there are three ways in which researchers have used multiple imputation and propensity-score matching together. Table OA1 summarizes the three methods. The primary difference between them is the point at which the estimates are combined across multiple imputations. Method I combines the  $m$  imputed values into one imputation and then obtains propensity scores for a single data set using those combined imputed values. Method II combines the  $m$  estimated propensity scores and implements the matching algorithm on a single data set using the combined propensity scores. Method III implements the entire procedure for each of the  $m$  imputed data sets and only combines the estimates at the very end.

An application of Method I can be found in the literature on international institutions (Chilton and Versteeg 2016), though its effectiveness in reducing bias has not been formally studied. However, note that this procedure is equivalent to creating only one data set where missing values are obtained from a single draw from the unobserved data. Thus, many advantages of multiple imputation are effectively lost and the estimates no longer reflect

uncertainty about the unobserved values. Whether Method II or Method III is more suited to minimizing bias in the estimates for the quantity of interest has not yet been formally demonstrated. In simulations, both methods are able to reduce bias significantly when compared to listwise deletion, but there is no consensus on which method is more effective when compared to one another (see Mitra and Reiter 2011, 2016; Hill 2004). Note, however, that Method II is designed for a setting in which the quantity of interest can be directly obtained from the matched data, e.g. by computing differences in means. If it is the intent to complement the matching algorithm with post-regression analysis, Method II is not suitable, as it leaves the researcher with a single data set. For this data set, the unobserved data is again missing, reintroducing the same problem that multiple imputation was employed to solve.<sup>1</sup> Method III is the only procedure that is consistent throughout in its treatment of the missing data problem by retaining the  $m$  imputed data sets until the analysis is completed. We therefore believe that Method III is the most appropriate procedure for our study.

The effect of the implementation of a matching procedure on the balance can be assessed by comparing the mean improvement in difference of propensity scores between treated and control units (Chilton and Versteeg 2016). We thus collect the difference in the means of the propensity score

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<sup>1</sup>One can think of ways in which the researcher uses multiple imputation a second time after obtaining the combined propensity scores. However, we are not aware of any study that has attempted to implement such a procedure; its effectiveness remains untested and unknown.

for treated and control units before and after matching for each of the 100 imputations. Figure OA2 plots this mean difference across all 100 imputations, together with 95% confidence intervals for Models (2), (3) and (4). The matching algorithm successfully and significantly increases the balance of our propensity scores by over 50%, in turn significantly ameliorating concerns that any results are driven by differences in observed characteristics or by extrapolation to a covariate range that lacks common support.


Figure OA1 depicts the difference in coefficient estimates and confidence intervals obtained by listwise deletion and multiple imputation for our full model. Figure OA2 demonstrates the improvement on propensity score balance after implementing the matching algorithm.

Table OA1: Combining Multiple Imputation and Matching

	Method I	Method II	Method III
Step 1	Create Imputed Data Set	Create Imputed Data Set	Create Imputed Data Set
Step 2	Repeat $m$ Times	Compute Propensity Scores	Compute Propensity Scores
Step 3	Combine Imputed and Unobserved Values	Repeat $m$ Times	Implement Matching Algorithm
Step 4	Compute Propensity Scores	Combine Propensity Scores	Compute Quantity of Interest
Step 5	Implement Matching Algorithm	Implement Matching Algorithm	Repeat $m$ Times
Step 6	Compute Quantity of Interest	Compute Quantity of Interest	Combine Results


*A description of different procedures to combine multiple imputation and matching analysis.*

Figure OA1: Listwise Deletion vs. Multiple-Imputation



*This graph depicts differences between listwise deletion and multiple-imputation in the coefficient estimates and confidence intervals of our analysis for Model (3).*

Figure OA2: Balance Improvement Through Matching



*This graph depicts differences in the means of propensity scores between treated and control units for Models (2), (3) and (4).*

## OA2 Bias Reduction Using Different Calipers

Table OA2: Bias Reduction by Caliper

Caliper	# Units	Bias
0.1	102	-97%
0.2	118	-91%
0.3	118	-86%
0.4	120	-80%
0.5	130	-73%
0.6	136	-62%
0.7	148	-51%
0.8	158	-43%
0.9	160	-36%
1.0	164	-28%
1.1	168	-24%
1.2	168	-21%
1.3	170	-20%

*The table depicts the number of units and the reduction in mean differences of propensity scores between panels with lawyer chairs and those with non-lawyer chairs for different calipers in the matching algorithm.*



### OA3 Full Regression Tables

Table OA3: Post-Matching Regression Analysis

	<i>Dependent Variable:</i>			
	Precedent Citation			
	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)	Model (4)
Lawyer Chair	-0.265*	-0.248**	-0.622***	-0.470**
	(0.112)	(0.100)	(0.171)	(0.169)
CL Chair	0.198	0.290**	0.077	0.117
	(0.108)	(0.120)	(0.159)	(0.163)
Chair Experience	-0.023	-0.023	-0.085***	-0.088**
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.031)	(0.031)
Lawyer-Panelists = 1	0.003	0.052	0.063	-0.037
	(0.163)	(0.171)	(0.169)	(0.165)
Lawyer-Panelists = 2	0.157	0.191	0.195	-0.152
	(0.184)	(0.197)	(0.193)	(0.193)

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Table OA3 – continued from previous page

	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)	Model (4)
CL Panelists = 1	-0.262* (0.120)	-0.071 (0.131)	-0.139 (0.131)	-0.346* (0.141)
CL Panelists = 2	-0.296 (0.229)	-0.048 (0.253)	-0.007 (0.248)	-0.064 (0.233)
DG Appointed Panel	-0.094 (0.122)	-0.037 (0.134)	0.030 (0.138)	-0.041 (0.131)
GATT I	0.178 (0.175)	0.168 (0.188)	0.215 (0.184)	0.129 (0.182)
GATT II	-0.149 (0.175)	-0.133 (0.179)	-0.098 (0.177)	-0.077 (0.184)
GATT III	0.532** (0.180)	0.456** (0.194)	0.464** (0.190)	0.319 (0.198)

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Table OA3 – continued from previous page

	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)	Model (4)
ADA	0.026 (0.144)	0.138 (0.154)	0.104 (0.151)	0.002 (0.154)
Safeguards	0.386 (0.226)	0.253 (0.251)	0.418 (0.248)	0.292 (0.222)
SPS	-0.359 (0.246)	-0.344 (0.246)	0.304 (0.245)	0.431 (0.241)
SCM	-0.413** (0.146)	-0.364** (0.161)	-0.405** (0.158)	-0.271 (0.161)
Volume		-0.078** (0.031)	-0.082** (0.030)	-0.062* (0.031)
CL Parties	0.240** (0.082)	0.200** (0.087)	0.201** (0.086)	0.253** (0.087)
DC vs. NDC	0.039	-0.006	-0.042	-0.129

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Table OA3 – continued from previous page

	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)	Model (4)
	(0.120)	(0.128)	(0.126)	(0.126)
# Words (Rest)	-0.021*	-0.029***	-0.032***	-0.031**
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
LC * CLC			0.343	0.182
			(0.241)	(0.258)
LC * Chair Experience			0.090**	0.089*
			(0.039)	(0.040)
Pieter Jan Kuijper (Director)				0.251
				(0.323)
Valerie Hughes (Director)				0.900
				(0.494)
William Davey (Director)				-1.189*
				(0.475)

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Table OA3 – continued from previous page

	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)	Model (4)
Constant	-7.562*** (0.374)	-7.616*** (0.375)	-7.376*** (0.376)	-6.326*** (0.356)
Year Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	194	170	170	170
Pseudo-R <sup>2</sup>	0.368	0.408	0.433	0.466
Log Likelihood	-907	-789	-785	-779
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,664	1,653	1,650	1,640

Note: \*p<0.05; \*\*p<0.01; \*\*\*p<0.001

*The output of a negative binomial regression. (1) omits Volume, which contains missing values. For (2), missing values for Volume were imputed through multiple-imputation. Then, the data was matched using nearest-neighbor propensity score matching, where treatment is defined as having a lawyer chair on the panel. (3) adds interaction terms. (4) includes fixed effects for the Director-General of the WTO Secretariat. Standard errors in parentheses. AIC and Log-Likelihood estimates are averages across iterations. Volume in bio\$, words in units of 10,000.*

Table OA4: Regression Analysis Using Alternative Outcome Measures

	<i>Dependent Variable:</i>	
	Unique Citations	Panel Citations
Lawyer Chair	-0.470** (0.131)	-0.199 (0.230)
CL Chair	0.222 (0.123)	0.245 (0.215)
Chair Experience	-0.076** (0.024)	-0.075 (0.042)
Lawyer-Panelists = 1	0.215 (0.136)	0.014 (0.227)
Lawyer-Panelists = 2	0.191 (0.153)	-0.031 (0.258)
CL Panelists = 1	-0.166 (0.103)	0.320 (0.179)

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Table OA4 – continued from previous page

	Unique Citations	Panel Citations
CL Panelists = 2	0.196 (0.186)	-0.252 (0.345)
DG Appointed Panel	-0.119 (0.106)	0.019 (0.187)
GATT I	0.078 (0.140)	-0.034 (0.245)
GATT II	-0.197 (0.140)	-0.158 (0.242)
GATT III	0.191 (0.145)	0.502* (0.252)
ADA	0.079 (0.121)	0.144 (0.206)

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Table OA4 – continued from previous page

	Unique Citations	Panel Citations
Safeguards	0.202 (0.193)	-0.334 (0.251)
SPS	0.112 (0.200)	-0.324 (0.331)
SCM	-0.159 (0.122)	0.300 (0.212)
Volume	-0.034 (0.025)	0.023 (0.040)
CL Parties	0.146* (0.067)	0.148 (0.118)
DC vs. NDC	-0.010 (0.099)	-0.098 (0.178)
# Words (Rest)	-0.036***	-0.027*

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Table OA4 – continued from previous page

	Unique Citations	Panel Citations
	(0.008)	(0.014)
LC * CLC	0.151 (0.190)	0.296 (0.325)
LC * Chair Experience	0.071* (0.031)	0.038 (0.053)
Constant	-8.874*** (0.370)	-7.261*** (0.475)
Year Fixed Effects	✓	✓
Observations	170	170
Pseudo-R <sup>2</sup>	0.405	0.297
Log Likelihood	-505	-645
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,091	1,370

Note: \*p<0.05; \*\*p<0.01; \*\*\*p<0.001

*The output of a negative binomial regression of our preferred Model (3) with alternative*

*outcome measures. “Unique Citations” regresses the count of unique Appellate Body reports cited in a decision on the specified covariates. “Panel Citations” regresses the count of citations to regular panel decisions on the specified covariates. Standard errors in parentheses. AIC and Log-Likelihood estimates are averages across iterations. Volume in bio\$, words in units of 10,000.*

Table OA5: Alternative Model Specifications

	<i>Dependent Variable:</i>			
	Precedent Citation			
	Poisson	Beta	– Offset	– Outliers
Lawyer Chair	–0.762*** (0.150)	–0.468*** (0.182)	–0.604*** (0.170)	–0.548** (0.168)
CL Chair	0.079 (0.162)	0.157 (0.142)	0.088 (0.159)	0.103 (0.152)
Chair Experience	–0.094*** (0.032)	–0.054* (0.026)	–0.080** (0.023)	–0.076* (0.030)
Lawyer-Panelists = 1	–0.128 (0.180)	–0.112 (0.152)	0.088 (0.171)	0.083 (0.165)
Lawyer-Panelists = 2	–0.034 (0.206)	0.072 (0.172)	0.214 (0.195)	0.160 (0.188)
CL Panelists = 1	–0.015 (0.119)	–0.077 (0.117)	–0.124 (0.195)	–0.084 (0.131)

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Table OA5 – continued from previous page

	Poisson	Beta	↔ Offset	↔ Outliers
CL Panelists = 2	0.253 (0.185)	0.066 (0.228)	0.009 (0.251)	0.010 (0.247)
DG Appointed Panel	-0.004 (0.147)	0.016 (0.121)	0.026 (0.138)	0.113 (0.137)
GATT I	0.367 (0.184)	-0.028 (0.171)	0.242 (0.181)	0.269 (0.176)
GATT II	-0.308 (0.201)	-0.177 (0.162)	-0.115 (0.175)	-0.089 (0.176)
GATT III	0.376*** (0.170)	0.395* (0.173)	0.471* (0.187)	0.387* (0.181)
ADA	-0.005 (0.173)	0.101 (0.132)	0.115 (0.154)	-0.027 (0.149)

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Table OA5 – continued from previous page

	Poisson	Beta	↯ Offset	↯ Outliers
Safeguards	0.054 (0.245)	0.378 (0.224)	0.406 (0.248)	0.365 (0.245)
SPS	0.148 (0.238)	0.458* (0.221)	0.309 (0.248)	0.260 (0.243)
SCM	-0.449 (0.140)	-0.276 (0.141)	-0.410** (0.157)	-0.434** (0.153)
Volume	-0.101** (0.036)	-0.072* (0.021)	-0.089** (0.030)	-0.089** (0.031)
CL Parties	0.090 (0.086)	0.156* (0.073)	0.189* (0.087)	0.170* (0.083)
DC vs. NDC	0.021 (0.110)	-0.034 (0.112)	-0.011 (0.127)	-0.044 (0.124)
Log(# Words Findings)			0.972***	

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Table OA5 – continued from previous page

	Poisson	Beta	↯ Offset	↯ Outliers
			(0.077)	
# Words (Rest)	-0.034** (0.011)	-0.035** (0.010)	-0.029** (0.010)	-0.031** (0.010)
LC * CLC	0.471* (0.224)	0.157 (0.250)	0.337 (0.241)	0.306 (0.237)
LC * Chair Experience	0.120** (0.037)	0.073* (0.034)	0.085* (0.039)	0.088* (0.039)
Constant	-6.759*** (0.367)	-6.930*** (0.387)	-7.088** (0.727)	-7.400*** (0.371)
Year Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓

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Table OA5 – continued from previous page

	Poisson	Beta	↯ Offset	↯ Outliers
Observations	170	170	170	170
Pseudo-R <sup>2</sup>	0.516	0.448	0.754	0.413
Log Likelihood	-2,215	942	-783	-781
Akaike Inf. Crit.	4,509	-1,805	-1,641	1,643

*Note:*

\*p<0.05; \*\*p<0.01; \*\*\*p<0.001

*Alternative parametric assumptions for the full model. Multiple-imputation with subsequent nearest-neighbor matching and regression analysis. AIC and Log-Likelihood estimates are averages across iterations. Volume in bio\$, words in units of 10,000.*

Table OA6: Sensitivity Analysis

	<i>Dependent Variable:</i>			
	Precedent Citation			
	Minimal	Panel	Dispute	Party
Lawyer Chair	-0.275*	-0.280*	-0.269*	-0.291*
	(0.113)	(0.114)	(0.109)	(0.114)
CL Chair		0.201		
		(0.123)		
Chair Experience		-0.015		
		(0.021)		
Lawyer-Panelists = 1		0.032		
		(0.175)		
Lawyer-Panelists = 2		-0.064		
		(0.192)		
CL Panelists = 1		-0.035		
		(0.129)		

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Table OA6 – continued from previous page

	Minimal	Panel	Dispute	Party
CL Panelists = 2		-0.094 (0.246)		
DG Appointed Panel		-0.090 (0.126)		
GATT I			0.233 (0.178)	
GATT II			-0.198 (0.173)	
GATT III			0.315 (0.175)	
ADA			0.161 (0.146)	
Safeguards			0.291	

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Table OA6 – continued from previous page

	Minimal	Panel	Dispute	Party
			(0.246)	
SPS			0.322 (0.228)	
SCM			-0.441** (0.156)	
CL Parties				0.056 (0.087)
DC vs. NDC				-0.001 (0.123)
# Words (Rest)	-0.025** (0.009)	-0.023* (0.009)	-0.034*** (0.009)	-0.025** (0.009)
Constant	-6.973*** (0.291)	-7.160*** (0.354)	-7.186*** (0.302)	-7.004*** (0.300)

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Table OA6 – continued from previous page

	Minimal	Panel	Dispute	Party
Year Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	170	170	170	170
Pseudo-R <sup>2</sup>	0.276	0.291	0.344	0.278
Log Likelihood	-809.404	-807.508	-800.409	-809.208
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,658.807	1,669.015	1,654.818	1,662.416

Note: \*p<0.05; \*\*p<0.01; \*\*\*p<0.001

*The output of a negative binomial regression. Each model adds a different set of controls (minimum, panel characteristics, dispute characteristics, party characteristics) in order to investigate how the coefficient on Lawyer Chair changes with inclusion. Standard errors in parentheses. Volume in bio\$, words in units of 10,000.*

Table OA7: Regression of Reversal Rate on Citation Frequency

	<i>Dependent Variable:</i>	
	Reversal Rate	
	Model (5)	Model (6)
Precedent	-0.210* (0.094)	-0.437** (0.152)
Lawyer Chair	0.114 (0.327)	-0.686 (0.407)
CL Chair	0.114* (0.057)	0.006 (0.075)
Chair Experience	0.544 (0.296)	0.449 (0.254)
Lawyer-Panelists = 1	-0.397 (0.312)	-0.308 (0.281)
Lawyer-Panelists = 2	-0.260 (0.358)	0.034 (0.333)

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Table OA7 – continued from previous page

	Model (5)	Model (6)
CL Panelists = 1	-0.058 (0.238)	0.118 (0.216)
CL Panelists = 2	-1.009 (0.567)	-0.655 (0.508)
DG Appointed Panel	-0.283 (0.256)	-0.080 (0.240)
GATT I	0.297 (0.321)	0.220 (0.282)
GATT II	-0.232 (0.326)	-0.281 (0.303)
GATT III	-0.394 (0.350)	-0.579 (0.340)

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Table OA7 – continued from previous page

	Model (5)	Model (6)
ADA	0.273 (0.291)	0.267 (0.265)
Safeguards	-0.008 (0.430)	0.028 (0.382)
SPS	-0.006 (0.485)	0.001 (0.431)
SCM	-1.042** (0.327)	-1.192*** (0.296)
Volume	-0.030 (0.056)	-0.035 (0.050)
CL Parties	0.671*** (0.175)	0.613*** (0.155)
DS vs. NDC	-0.221	-0.360

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Table OA7 – continued from previous page

	Model (5)	Model (6)
	(0.245)	(0.218)
# Words (Rest)	0.016 (0.018)	0.013 (0.016)
LC*CLC	-0.693 (0.473)	-0.759 (0.411)
LC*Experience	-0.202* (0.082)	0.195 (0.111)
Precedent*LC		0.639** (0.200)
Precedent*Experience		0.106* (0.048)
Precedent*LC*Experience		-0.277*** (0.067)

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Table OA7 – continued from previous page

	Model (5)	Model (6)
Constant	-0.646 (0.746)	-0.324 (0.695)
Year Fixed Effects	✓	✓
Observations	108	108
Pseudo-R <sup>2</sup>	0.445	0.561
Log Likelihood	-187	-176
Akaike Inf. Crit.	450	435

Note: \*p<0.05; \*\*p<0.01; \*\*\*p<0.001

*The output of a negative binomial regression of reversal rates on precedent citation frequencies. Model (5) adds a three-way interaction of citation frequency, the indicator for whether the chair is a lawyer and the chair's experience. Standard errors in parentheses. AIC and Log-Likelihood estimates are averages across iterations. Volume in bio\$, words in units of 10,000.*



Table OA8: Robustness Test for Reversal Analysis

	<i>Dependent Variable:</i>	
	Reversal Rate	
	Poisson	- Offset
Precedent	-0.447* (0.208)	-0.399** (0.147)
Lawyer Chair	-0.731 (0.494)	-0.770+ (0.394)
Chair Experience	0.008 (0.088)	0.006 (0.073)
Chair System	0.449+ (0.258)	0.480* (0.242)
Lawyer-Panelists = 1	-0.246 (0.313)	-0.243 (0.270)
Lawyer-Panelists = 2	0.096 (0.404)	0.025 (0.320)

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Table OA8 – continued from previous page

	Poisson	– Offset
CL Panelists = 1	0.125 (0.258)	0.093 (0.210)
CL Panelists = 2	–0.665 (0.438)	–0.649 (0.484)
DG Appointed Panel	–0.049 (0.256)	–0.037 (0.229)
GATT I	0.236 (0.278)	0.344 (0.276)
GATT II	–0.279 (0.316)	–0.324 (0.296)
GATT III	–0.618 (0.379)	–0.555 <sup>+</sup> (0.325)

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Table OA8 – continued from previous page

	Poisson	– Offset
ADA	0.264 (0.264)	0.386 (0.265)
Safeguards	0.070 (0.399)	0.167 (0.373)
SPS	0.0004 (0.423)	0.130 (0.419)
SCM	-1.206*** (0.340)	-1.118*** (0.286)
Volume	-0.039 (0.064)	-0.020 (0.048)
CL Parties	0.622*** (0.175)	0.533*** (0.155)
DS vs. NDC	-0.362	-0.271

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Table OA8 – continued from previous page

	Poisson	– Offset
	(0.198)	(0.213)
# Words (Rest)	0.015 (0.016)	0.018 (0.016)
Log(# Claims)		0.730*** (0.154)
LC*Experience	0.216* (0.105)	0.198+ (0.108)
LC*CLC	-0.896+ (0.493)	-0.800* (0.394)
Precedent*LC	0.681** (0.249)	0.629*** (0.191)
Precedent*Experience	0.110+ (0.057)	0.090+ (0.047)

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Table OA8 – continued from previous page

	Poisson	– Offset
Precedent*LC*Experience	–0.285*** (0.061)	–0.245*** (0.067)
Constant	–0.386 (0.836)	–0.195 (0.676)
Year Fixed Effects	✓	✓
Observations	108	108
Pseudo-R <sup>2</sup>	0.589	0.637
Log Likelihood	–178	–176
Akaike Inf. Crit.	437	437

Note: <sup>+</sup>p<0.1; \*p<0.05; \*\*p<0.01; \*\*\*p<0.001

*Alternative parametric assumptions for the full model estimating the association between precedent usage and reversal rates. Missing values are imputed 100 times and results. AIC and Log-Likelihood estimates are averages across iterations. Volume in bio\$, words in units of 10,000.*

Table OA9: Sensitivity Analysis for Reversal Rates

	<i>Dependent Variable:</i>			
	Reversal Rate			
	Minimal	Panel	Dispute	Party
Precedent	-0.223 (0.160)	-0.220 (0.166)	-0.378* (0.163)	-0.293+ (0.156)
Lawyer Chair	-0.375 (0.399)	-0.381 (0.453)	-0.762+ (0.428)	-0.481 (0.390)
Chair Experience	-0.010 (0.085)	-0.0003 (0.089)	-0.018 (0.083)	-0.011 (0.081)
CL Chair		0.359 (0.281)		
Lawyer-Panelists = 1		-0.473 (0.294)		
Lawyer-Panelists = 2		-0.238 (0.320)		

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Table OA9 – continued from previous page

	Minimal	Panel	Dispute	Party
CL Panelists = 1		0.015		
		(0.242)		
CL Panelists = 2		-0.713		
		(0.508)		
DG Appointed Panel		-0.471 <sup>+</sup>		
		(0.266)		
GATT I			0.149	
			(0.275)	
GATT II			-0.148	
			(0.307)	
GATT III			-0.734 <sup>*</sup>	
			(0.334)	
ADA			0.158	

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Table OA9 – continued from previous page

	Minimal	Panel	Dispute	Party
			(0.254)	
Safeguards			-0.167	
			(0.370)	
SPS			-0.097	
			(0.457)	
SCM			-0.841**	
			(0.299)	
CL Parties				0.444**
				(0.156)
DC vs. NDC				-0.345 <sup>+</sup>
				(0.200)
# Words (Rest)		0.004	0.016	-0.0001
		(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.014)

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Table OA9 – continued from previous page

	Minimal	Panel	Dispute	Party
LC*Experience	0.103 (0.121)	0.077 (0.132)	0.155 (0.117)	0.081 (0.114)
LC*CLC		-0.165 (0.477)		
Precedent*LC	0.413 <sup>+</sup> (0.227)	0.458* (0.234)	0.598* (0.233)	0.473* (0.219)
Precedent*Experience	0.079 (0.053)	0.060 (0.057)	0.101 <sup>+</sup> (0.052)	0.095 <sup>+</sup> (0.051)
Precedent*LC*Experience	-0.212** (0.076)	-0.203** (0.079)	-0.264*** (0.075)	-0.217** (0.071)
Constant	-0.468 (0.514)	-0.199 (0.655)	-0.121 (0.570)	-0.510 (0.524)
Year Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓

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Table OA9 – continued from previous page

	Minimal	Panel	Dispute	Party
Observations	108	108	108	108
Pseudo-R <sup>2</sup>	0.295	0.350	0.382	0.370
Log Likelihood	-200	-196	-194	-195
Akaike Inf. Crit.	445	452	448	439

Note: <sup>+</sup>p<0.1; \*p<0.05; \*\*p<0.01; \*\*\*p<0.001

*The output of a negative binomial regression. Each model adds a different set of controls (minimum, panel characteristics, dispute characteristics, party characteristics) in order to investigate how the coefficient on Precedent changes with inclusion. Standard errors in parentheses. Volume in bio\$, words in units of 10,000.*

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